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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
National Banking Association, 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a National corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case was decided by the trial court sitting without a 
jury. The principal issues in this case are: (a) whether First 
Security Financial ("First Security") had notice of a collateral 
assignment (the "Assignment") from Capitol Thrift & Loan Company 
("Capitol") of money owed by First Security under the Purchase 
Agreements prior to entering into the Settlement Agreement, and (b) 
whether the balance due Capitol from First Security under the 
Purchase Agreements was properly adjusted downward by the trial 
1 
No. 930293-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
court in the amount of $1,000,000.00 on First Security's motion for 
partial summary judgment. 
On review of a factual finding, Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is determinative. On summary judgment, Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is determinative.1 As to questions 
of notice, Utah Code Annotated Sections 70A-1-2012 and 70A-9-3183 
are determinative in this case. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure,4 Appellant 4447 Associates ("4447") replies herein only 
to those new matters raised by First Security not otherwise covered 
in 4447 's Brief of Appellant. 
1See Addendum 0. 
2See Addendum P. 
3See Addendum Q. 
4See Addendum R. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANT 4447 HAS PROPERLY MARSHALLED ALL OF 
THE EVIDENCE 
DEMONSTRATES 
; AS 
THAT 
MARSHALLED, THE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EVIDENCE 
FINDINGS 
OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, 
First Security argues in its brief that 4447 has not 
marshalled the evidence. This is a threshold issue to 
consideration of this appeal.5 First Security states, 
4447 Associates has cited this appellate court only the 
portions of the evidence favorable to its position. 
Because 4447 Associates did not marshal the evidence, 
this court should affirm the factual findings of the 
district court. 
Appellee's Brief at 30. First Security's argument asserts but 
fails to show that 4447 did not meet its burden to marshal the 
evidence. In fact, First Security has not cited any evidence which 
4447 did not include in its brief,6 nor has it cited any evidence 
5If appellant has failed to meet its burden of marshalling the 
evidence, this court will affirm the finding of the lower court. 
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
6In its entire brief, First Security has referred to only 
three pages of the trial transcript in its brief: Page 8, Footnote 
4, of Appellee's Brief refers to the "Transcript" at 138 [Record at 
937]; Page 16 of Appellee's brief cites to the "Transcript" twice 
at 106 [Record at 905]; Footnote 9, Page 24 of Appellee's brief 
cites the "Transcript" at 106 [Record at 905]; Page 31 of 
Appellee's brief cites the "Transcript" at 65 [Record at 864]. 
These three citations to the record are contained in 4447 's Brief 
of Appellant as follows: Record at 937 is found at footnotes 34 and 
73 and accompanying text; Record at 905 is found at footnotes 41 
and 73 and accompanying text; and Record at 864 is found at 
footnotes 41 and 73 and accompanying text, respectively. 
3 
which supports its bald assertion that 4447 has cited "only the 
portions of the evidence favorable to its position."7 Instead, 
First Security has elected merely to restate the factual findings 
of the trial court throughout its brief. By doing so, First 
Security relies only on the trial court's findings and has not 
shown from the evidence that 4447 did not meet its burden to 
marshal the evidence. 
Under Utah law, "In order to show clear error, the appellant 
'must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Estate of Ashton 
v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Grayson 
Roper Limited v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
Thereafter, the appellee may refer to evidence presented to the 
trial court to which the appellant did not refer and thereby show 
that appellant has failed to meet its burden to marshal the 
evidence. As stated above, First Security has failed to show that 
4447 did not properly marshal the evidence in the Brief of 
Appellant. Accordingly, after review of the Brief of Appellant, 
this Court should find that 4447 has met its burden to marshal the 
evidence and may now examine the sufficiency of the trial court's 
findings. 
Appellee's Brief at 30. 
4 
II, THE NOTICE DEFINITIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION 
70A-1-201 ARE APPLICABLE TO SECTION 70A-9-318. 
UNDER SECTION 70A-1-201, FIRST SECURITY RECEIVED 
PROPER NOTICE OF THE ASSIGNMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
70A-9-318. 
First Security states that the definitions of notice in 
Section 70A-1-201 are not applicable to the provisions of Section 
70A-9-318.8 First Security further states that 4447 's position 
that the definitions contained in Section 70A-1-201 are applicable 
to the provisions of Section 70A-9-318 is "frivolous and should be 
rejected by this Court."9 
However, later in its brief, First Security concedes that the 
definitions in Chapter One of the UCC are "relevant only if terms 
that are defined in that section are used elsewhere in the Uniform 
Commercial Code."10 First Security further concedes, "Once a 
court has analyzed the applicable statutory provision (section 70A-
9-318), then the court should look to the definitions contained in 
section 70A-1-201 for additional guidance as to the definition of 
terms used in section 70A-9-318. In this case, Section 70A-1-
bAppellee's Brief at 14. Appellee cites no case law or 
statute in support of this claim. 
9Appellee's Brief at 14. Appellee cites no case law or 
statute in support of this claim. 
10Appellee's Brief at 24-25. 
5 
201(26)(b) provides guidance as to the term 'receives 
notification, ' which is used in section 70A-9-318. M11 
First Security thereby concedes that the definitions contained 
in 70A-1-201 are applicable in determining whether notice was 
received, despite its initial statement that 4447's argument on 
this point is frivolous. 4447 also asserts that the definitions in 
Section 70A-1-201(25, 27) are similarly relevant and helpful in 
determining that First Security received notice under Section 70A-
9-318. Therefore, 4447 relies on its argument and supporting 
authorities which are cited in its appellant's brief regarding 
Section 70A-1-201(25-27).12 
11Appellee's Brief at 25. See also Ertel v. Radio Corporation 
of America, 307 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ind. 1974)("Notification is 
nowhere defined in 9-318(3), but is defined in 1-201(26). . . .") ; 
Chase Manhattan Bank v. State of New York, 357 N.E.2d 366, 369 
(N.Y. 1976)("Although [the] Uniform Commercial Code does not 
designate any particular person or place for receipt of notice, 
least of all to the State, the code does provide, in general terms, 
conditions under which delivery of notice will be effective. The 
provisions are relevant and supportive of the analysis (see Uniform 
Commercial Code, s 1-201, subds. (26), (27))"). 
12See Brief of Appellant at 21-41 and the authorities cited 
therein. The official comment to Section 9-318 of the UCC also 
provides that if First Security and Christenson had a question 
regarding the sufficiency of the notification or the Assignment 
itself, it had a duty to inquire of Zions: 
Subsection (3) requires reasonable identification of the 
account assigned and recognizes the right of an account 
debtor to require reasonable proof of the making of the 
assignment . . . . If the notification does not contain 
such reasonable identification or if such reasonable 
proof is not furnished on request, the account debtor may 
disregard the assignment and make payment to the 
assignor. What is "reasonable" is not left to the 
arbitrary decision of the account debtor; if there is 
doubt as to the adequacy either of a notification or of 
proof submitted after request, the account debtor may not 
be safe in disregarding it unless he has notified the 
6 
III. 
UNDER SECTION 70A-9-318m, 4447 IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE DEFENSE THAT THE DEBT AT ISSUE 
HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED. 
First Security has argued that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9-318(l), it was entitled to satisfy its obligation to its 
original creditor, Capitol.13 In support of this argument, First 
Security further cites Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,14 
where the court held that "absent notice, it is to be noted that 
the claims of the Bank, as assignee, were subject to any defense 
the Church, as account debtor had against Cook, as assignor, 70A-9-
318(1)(a)."15 First Security further argues, "Absent receipt of 
assignee with commercial promptness as to the respects in 
which identification or proof is considered defective. 
Uniform Commercial Code (1978 Ed.), West Publishing Co., 
at 729. 
There is no evidence in the record, and none was presented at trial 
by First Security, which shows that First Security inquired of 
Zions regarding any defect or uncertainty in the notification of 
the Assignment was defective. Yet Christenson knew enough about 
the Assignment that he felt compelled to disclose it to First 
Security in three separate financial statements at a time 
immediately previous to the execution of the Settlement Agreement. 
See discussion infra and Record at 779-80 regarding Christenson's 
disclosures to First Security. 
-^Appellee's brief at 14 and Record at 678. 
14534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). 
15Appellee's Brief at 15 (emphasis added). It should be noted 
that appellee misguoted the section number in its brief as Section 
70A-9-3_l_3(l) (a) . However, after review of the text of the case, 
the section number guoted by the Court was Section 70A-9-318(l)(a). 
7 
notification16 by First Security prior to the time the settlement 
agreement was entered into, 4447 Associates as the successor in 
interest to Zions First National Bank, N.A. ("Zions"), is subject 
to the defense that the debt has been completely satisfied"17 and 
that Zions was subject to the defense of settlement of the debt 
under 70A-9-318(1)(b). 
4447 agrees with First Security's assertion and its supporting 
citation to Bank of Salt Lake, but notes that First Security's 
argument is correct only true if First Security did not receive 
notice of the Assignment. Indeed, the reverse is also true: If 
First Security received notice of the Assignment prior to the time 
the Settlement Agreement was entered into, Zions' rights in the 
Purchase Agreements were not extinguished or modified even though 
First Security and Capitol executed the Settlement Agreement. In 
point of fact, First Security did receive notice of the Assignment 
prior to execution of the Settlement Agreement through Christenson 
and its receipt of three copies of his financial statement as shown 
infra at A. Thus, under Section 70A-9-318(1), 4447 Associates is 
not subject to First Security's defense that the debt evidenced by 
the Purchase Agreements via the Settlement Agreement was satisfied 
because First Security received notice of the Assignment before it 
executed the Settlement Agreement. 
16Presumably First Security means "receipt of notification" as 
defined in Section 70A-1-201. 
17Appellee's brief at 16. It is also interesting to note that 
First Security finally agrees and argues that Zions was only 
required to notify First Security of the Assignment. 
8 
Subsection 1 of Section 70A-9-318 provides: 
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable 
agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of 
a sale as provided in Section 70A-9-206 the rights of an 
assignee are subject to: 
(a) all the terms of the contract between 
the account debtor and assignor and any 
defense or claim arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the 
account debtor against the assignor which 
accrues before the account debtor receives 
notification of the assignment. 
The comment to that section provides, 
Subsection (1) makes no substantial change in prior 
law. An assignee has traditionally been subject to 
defenses or setoffs existing before an account debtor is 
notified of the assignment. . . . The account debtor may 
also have claims against the assignor which arise 
independently of that contract: an assignee is subject 
to all such claims which accrue before, and free of all 
those which accrue after, the account debtor is notified 
(paragraph (lWbn. l d 
The comment to Subsection 1 is devoid of any requirement that the 
assignee give both notice and demand for payment under 9-318(1). 
Instead, the comment merely refers to notice and notification.19 
Therefore, it is 4447 who enjoys the protection of Subsection 1 of 
Section 70A-9-318 and not First Security. 
Professors White & Summers also recognize this rule. "Under 
the Restatement rule, defenses which cannot be asserted against an 
18Uniform Commercial Code (1978), West Publishing Co., at 727 
(parenthetical reference by the authors of the UCC). 
19
 Id. 
9 
assignee are limited to those based on facts arising after the 
obligor has notice of the assignment."20 
A. The undisputed evidence in this case 
clearly shows that First Security received 
notice of the Assignment prior to its 
execution of the Settlement Agreement. 
First Security argues that prior to the execution of the 
Settlement Agreement, it never received notice of the Assignment 
and that Christenson's knowledge of Capitol's intent to make an 
assignment in favor of Zions was insufficient to put First Security 
on notice of the Assignment. 4447 believes that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous that notice was not received by 
First Security, and that First Security was under no duty to 
inquire regarding the Assignment.21 
^
uWhite & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, §14-11, (1972) at 
490. The Restatement section referred to is Restatement of 
Contracts, §167(1)(1932). 
21See also Appellant's Brief at 21-41, regarding the 
discussions of notice issues such as Christenson's conversations 
with Potts, the mailing and receipt of the Notice of Assignment, 
etc. 
4447 argues that Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking 
Company, 458 P.2d 1873 (Utah 1969) in inapposite for the reasons 
cited in the Brief of Appellant at 32-35. However, even under Time 
Finance and contrary to the trial court's holding in this case that 
knowledge of the existence of the Assignment did not impose a duty 
of inquiry upon First Security, the Supreme Court expressly stated 
in Time Finance, 458 P. 2d 1873 (Utah 1969) that such a duty of 
inquiry exists: 
Even though there is no actual knowledge of an 
assignment, if there is knowledge of such facts as would 
put a reasonable man upon inquiry, and as would indicate 
10 
However, and perhaps more importantly, the trial court's 
findings as entered, clearly show that First Security received 
actual notice of the Assignment prior to First Security's attempt 
to compromise the receivable by executing the Settlement Agreement 
with Capitol.22 The trial court expressly found that First 
Security received the financial statements of Christenson on three 
separate occasions in connection with the negotiations between 
First Security and Capitol to compromise the receivable.23 In its 
Findings of Fact, the trial court quoted language from 
Christenson's financial statement disclosing the Assignment24 
which financial statement was delivered three separate times to 
First Security: 
This represents my portion of the ownership of Capitol 
Thrift & Loan based on the contract amount I have with 
First Security Financial. This receivable has been 
pledged to Zions First National Bank.25 
These disclosures occurred after Christenson was terminated, 
but before Capitol and First Security executed the Settlement 
heedless disregard of others' rights if no attention were 
paid to them, the effect is the same as if actual notice 
had been given. 
The Time Finance court concluded, "As to what inquiry must be made 
to satisfy the requirement of the law in this respect must be 
determined from the circumstances in each individual case." Id. at 
876. 
22Record at 779-80, 5523-24. 
23Id. 
24See Addenda A and B. 
25Id. 
11 
Agreement. b These notices of the Assignment were received by 
First Security at precisely the time when First Security was making 
its most careful and thorough investigation and analysis of the 
obligation evidenced by the Purchase Agreements;27 in July 1985, 
First Security was negotiating with Capitol to extinguish and 
satisfy the entire debt due under the Purchase Agreements. 
Certainly there can be no more important information to an 
account debtor at the time he is negotiating with the assignor to 
satisfy the debt than to learn that his obligation has been 
collaterally assigned. If the account debtor proceeds with his 
negotiations after notice of the assignment and compromises the 
debt, the assignee will inevitably challenge the agreement between 
the account debtor and the assignor. In that case, the account 
debtor will have to pay the assignee the value of the collateral 
which was compromised, modified or extinguished by the account 
debtor/assignor agreement. Thus, only an imprudent or careless 
account debtor would not communicate with the assignee after 
learning of the collateral assignment. 
ZbSee discussion of these disclosures in Brief of Appellant at 
29-35. 
27The evidence regarding Christenson's financial statements 
was unrefuted at trial and is undisputed by First Security on 
appeal. 4447 argues that because this evidence is undisputed, this 
Court should review the trial court's legal conclusion that notice 
was not given for correctness. Record at 780-781, Conclusions of 
Law H5 2,3,4,5,6, On appeal from an order regarding questions of 
law, the appellate court reviews the conclusions of law made by the 
trial court for correctness, and gives them no special deference. 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah App.1993)(cit ing 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
12 
From the evidence found by the trial court, First Security 
failed to communicate with Zions after it received notice of the 
Assignment on three different occasions prior to execution of the 
Settlement Agreement.28 Thus, pursuant to 70A-9-318(l) and the 
undisputed evidence that First Security had notice of the 
Assignment prior to execution of the Settlement Agreement which 
purportedly extinguished the debt owed Zions, 4447 is not subject 
to First Security's defense that the debt was settled with Capitol. 
B. Case law in Utah and other jurisdictions 
dictates that under Section 70A-9-318m , 4447 
is not subject to First Security's attempt to 
extinguish the debt via First Security's 
purported settlement with Capitol. 
The law in several jurisdictions supports the proposition that 
once notification of an assignment has been received, the account 
debtor compromises the debt at his peril. In Pioneer Commercial 
Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R. 871, 882-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), the Court stated, 
Turning to section 9-318(1)(b), therefore, the provision 
specifically states that the assignee takes subject to 
the debtor's claims against the assignor that accrue 
prior to the debtor's receipt of notification of the 
assignment. United suggests that notification of the 
assignment in this context requires both notification of 
the assignment and a demand for payment, which is 
precisely the interpretation it gives to section 9-
318(3). Unfortunately, this proposition ignores the fact 
that the language used in sub-divisions 1 and 3 of 
section 9-318 is not identical. While a two-pronged 
notice requirement is mandated by sub-division 3, only 
notification of the assignment is required under sub-
Record at 682-83. 
13 
division 1. If notification of the assignment in sub-
division 1 means both notification of the assignment and 
a demand for payment as United contends, it would be 
redundant to specifically include both requirements in 
sub-division 3. Looking at the specific language of the 
statute, it appears clear that the responsibilities 
incumbent upon an assignee under section 9-318(1) are 
less stringent than those required by section 9-318(3). 
This may be a function of the differing purposes of the 
two provisions. United's attempt to merge the sections 
ignores the statutory language and clouds the true issues 
before us. 
Having decided that notification under section 9-318(1) does 
not require a demand for payment, the next issue for the court was 
whether United's purported right to a setoff accrued before or 
after the account debtor received notification of the 
assignment.29 However, the court stated that issue was not before 
it at that time.30 The Court also noted, "Even if section 9-
318(1)(b)'s notification requirement was meant to include both 
provisions of section 9-318(3), it is not settled that a specific 
demand for payment, as opposed to simple actual notice of the 
assignment and the assignee's right to payment, is required by 
section 318(3)."31 
The Pioneer Commercial court concluded, "For all the foregoing 
reasons, we find United's contention that a demand for payment was 
29Id. at 883, 
30
 Id. 
31122 B.R. at 883, fn.13 (emphasis added) 
14 
required as a condition precedent to Pioneer's claims to be without 
merit."32 
Finally, as acknowledged and argued by First Security, Utah 
law recognizes that after receipt of notification of an assignment, 
an assignee is not subject to the account debtor's defense that the 
debt was compromised after the account debtor had notice of the 
assignment. In Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,33 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "absent notice, it is to be noted that the 
*
2Id. at 883 (emphasis added). See also Rosenthal & 
Rosenthal, Inc. v. John Kunstadt, Inc., 482 N.Y.S. 2d 287, 288 
(N.Y.App.Div. 1984)("It is plain, therefore, that defendant may not 
assert as against plaintiff any unrelated claim which defendant may 
have had against Ramsay unless it arose prior to the notice from 
Ramsay of the assignment of the account to plaintiff. The record 
indicates that defendant's claim against Ramsay arises out of a 
contract to deliver goods to defendant in installments and the 
alleged breach did not occur until at least two and possibly three 
months after defendant had received notice of the assignment. 
Hence, the allegations of breach by Ramsay cannot serve to defeat 
plaintiff's claims."); BarclaysAmerican/Business Credit, Inc. v. 
Paul Safran Metal Company, 566 F.Supp. 254, 257-58 (N.D.I11. 
1983)("The question remaining under the terms of 9-318(1)(b), then, 
is whether Safran's claim accrued prior to its receipt of 
notification that its account receivable had been assigned to 
Barclays. . . . Safran's final sale to Interstate occurred on July 
1, 1982, in the amount of $10,662.14. Because this sale occurred 
after Safran's receipt of notification under s 9-318(1)(b), it may 
not be used to reduce Barclays' claim."); In re Lewis Carpet Mills, 
24 B.R. 62 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1982)("Moreover, Rosenthal is precluded 
from asserting this claim against Maguire, which is an assignee of 
Lewis. The claims and defenses which can be raised against an 
assignee of an account arising out of a sale are limited by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Ga.Code Ann. §109A-9-318(1). . . . The 
claim for loss of value is one which, if recognized at all, is 
subject to Ga.Code Ann. §109A-9-318(1)(b). It is a claim which 
clearly accrued after Rosenthal received notification of the 
assignment of the accounts sued upon in this case.") 
534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). 
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claims of the Bank, as assignee, were subject to any defense the 
Church, as account debtor had against Cook, as assignor, 70A-9-
318(1)(a).H34 Conversely, after notice, an assignee is not 
subject to the claims and defenses of the account debtor. 
Accordingly, under Utah law and the UCC as interpreted in this 
and other jurisdictions, 4447 is not subject to First Security's 
alleged settlement of the debt in favor of Capitol, because 
execution of the Settlement Agreement occurred after First Security 
received notice of the Assignment. 
IV, 
THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR THE RECEIVABLE SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY ONE MILLION 
DOLLARS. 
First Security has failed to present new law or argue evidence 
which is different from its memoranda submitted in conjunction with 
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Therefore, 4447 reasserts 
that the granting of defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and the downward adjustment described in its Brief of 
Appellant was clear error. Furthermore, if there is a dispute 
about when the closing date occurred or ought to have occurred, 
which question is necessarily a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment, then this factual issue should have been resolved in 
34Appellee's Brief at 15 (emphasis added). Appellee misquoted 
the section number in its brief as 70A-9-313(1)(a). However, after 
review of the text of the case, the section number quoted by the 
Court was 70A-9-3JjJ(l) (a) . 
16 
favor of 4447.35 4447 hereby relies upon this and its arguments 
which are before the court on this issue.36 
CONCLUSION 
When marshalled together, all of the evidence adduced at trial 
by the defendant do not support the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of Judge Noel. Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment and hold that 
1) notice of the Assignment was received by First Security 
before it executed the Settlement Agreement, 
2) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) the 
Settlement Agreement did not extinguish the rights of Zions in the 
receivable owed by First Security to Capitol, and, 
3) the purchase price payable under the Purchase Agreements 
35When reviewing the trial court's decision granting summary 
judgment, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and affirms a 
grant of summary judgment only if the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. First American Commerce Company v. 
Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1987). 
36See Brief of Appellant at 41-45; Record at 385-390. 
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should not have been adjusted downward in the amount of 
$1,000,000,00. 
DATED this J~**j day of January, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Appellant 4447 
Associates 
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ADDENDUM R 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 676 
the original proceedings before the trial court has 
been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of 
the trial court shall immediately transmit the record 
of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of 
the supplemental record If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been trans-
mitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court 
shall transmit the record of the supplemental pro-
ceedings upon the preparation of the entire record 
(g) Appel la te cour t de te rminat ion . Upon receipt 
of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the 
court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules Errors 
claimed to have been made during the trial qourt pro-
ceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are review-
able under the same standards as the review of errors 
in other appeals The findings of fact entered pursu-
ant to this rule are reviewable under the same stan-
dards as the review of findings of fact in other ap-
peals 
(Added effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appel lant . The brief of the appel-
lant shall contain under appropriate headings and in 
the order indicated 
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceed-
ing in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the 
caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appeais immediatelv inside 
the cover 
(2) A table of contents, with Dage references 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabeti-
cally arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited 
'4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for re-
view and the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority for each issue 
(6) Constitutional provisions statutes ordi-
nances, rules and regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall 
be set forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this 
rule 
(7) A statement of the case The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow 
All statements of fact and references to the pro-
ceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record in accordance with paragraph <e) of 
this rule 
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of 
arguments, suitably paragraphed shall be a suc-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise re-
lief sought 
(b) Brief of the appel lee. The brief of the appellee 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
this rule except that a statement of the issues or of 
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dis-
satisfied with the statement of the appellant 
lc) Reply brief. The appellant mav file a brief m 
replv to the brief of the appellee and if the appellee 
has cross-appealed, the appellee mav file a brief m 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues 
presented by the cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), 
(6), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may be 
filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to part ies . Counsel will 
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep 
to a minimum references to parties by such designa-
tions as appellant" and appellee " It promotes clar-
ity to use the designations used in the lower court or 
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of 
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
'the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc 
<e) References in briefs to the record . Refer-
ences shall be made to the pages of the original record 
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the 
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of 
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement pre-
pared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers If reference is 
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in con-
troversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was identified, of-
fered, and received or rejected 
(f) Reproduc t ion of s ta tu tes , rules, regulat ions , 
documents , etc. If determination of the issues pre-
sented requires the study of statutes, rules, regula-
tions, etc , or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not 
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they 
shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum at 
the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pam-
phlet form Copies of those parts of the record on ap-
peal that are of central importance to the determina-
tion of the appeal (e g , the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum 
decision, the contract or document subject to con-
struction, etc ) shall also be included in the adden-
dum 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the 
court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and 
replv briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of cita-
tions and any addendum containing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (f) of this rule 
i h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a 
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of 
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes 
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise 
agree or the court otherwise orders The brief of the 
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to 
the brief of the appellant 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appel-
lants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join 
in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may 
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
677 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 27 
(j) Citation of supplemental au thor i t ies . When 
pertinent and significant authorities come to the at-
tention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a 
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court An original letter and seven copies^ shall be 
filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a refer 
ence either to the page of the brief or to a point ar-
gued orally to which the citations pertain, but the 
letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly 
limited 
(k) R e q u i r e m e n t s and sanc t ions . All briefs un-
der this rule must be concise, presented with accu-
racy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters Briefs which are not in compli-
ance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attor-
ney fees against the offending lawyer 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of 
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 ) 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus cur iae or guardian 
ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad 
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the 
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on 
motion or at the request of the court A motion for 
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and 
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable Except 
as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus cunae or 
guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the time 
allowed the party whose position as to affirmance or 
reversal the amicus curiae or guardian ad litem will 
support, unless the court for cause shown otherwise 
orders A motion of an amicus curiae or guardian ad 
litem to participate in the oral argument will be 
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's 
discretion 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The appel-
lant shall serve and file a brief within 40 days after 
date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court 
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary 
disposition of the appeal or a motion to remand for 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel has 
been previously interposed, in which event service 
and filing shall be within 30 days from the denial of 
such motion The appellee shall serve and file a brief 
within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief A 
reply brief may be served and filed by the appellant 
If a reply brief is filed, it shall be served and filed 
within 30 days after the filing and service of the ap-
pellee's bnef If oral argument is scheduled fewer 
than 35 days after the filing of appellee's brief, the 
reply brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral 
argument By stipulation filed with the court, the 
parties may extend each of such periods for no more 
than 30 days in civil cases or 15 days in criminal 
cases A motion for enlargement of time need not ac-
company the stipulation No such stipulation shall be 
effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the 
period sought to be extended 
b> Number of copies to be filed and served. 
Ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an 
original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court Eight copies of each brief one of 
which shall contain an original signature, shall be 
fled with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals Two 
cooies shall be served on counsel for each partv sepa-
rately represented 
c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an 
appellant fails to file a brief within the time provided 
in this rule, or within the time as may be extended by 
order of the appellate court, an appellee may move for 
dismissal of the appeal If an appellee fails to file a 
brief within the time provided by this rule, or within 
the time as may be extended by order of the appellate 
court, an appellant may move that the appellee not be 
heard at oral argument 
(d) Re tu rn of record to the clerk. Each party, 
upon the filing of its brief, shall return the record to 
the clerk of the court having custody pursuant to 
these rules 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) 
Rule 27. Form of briefs. 
'a) P a p e r size; printing and spacing. Briefs 
shall be typewritten, printed or prepared by 
photocopying or other duplicating or copying process 
that will pioduce clear, black and permanent copies 
equally legible to printing, in tvpe not smaller than 
ten characters per inch, on opaque, unglazed white 
paper 8V2 inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall 
be securely bound along the left margin The lmpres-
snn must be double spaced, except for matter custom-
arily single spaced and indented, with adequate mar-
gins on the top and sides of each page 
(b) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides 
of the page, and bound with a compact-type binding 
so as not unduly to increase the thickness of the brief 
along the bound side Coiled plastic and spiral-type 
bindings are not acceptable 
(c) Color o f cover, contents of cover. The cover 
of the brief of appellant shall be blue, that of appellee, 
red, that of intervenor, guardian ad litem, or amicus 
curiae, green, that of any reply brief, gray, that of 
an> petition for rehearing, tan, that of any response 
tc a petition for rehearing, white, that of a petition 
for certiorari, white, that of a response to a petition 
for certiorari, orange, and that of a reply to the re-
sponse to a petition for certiorari, yellow All bnef 
covers shall be of heavy cover stock. There shall be 
adequate contrast between the printing and the color 
ot the cover The cover of all briefs shall set forth in 
the caption the full title given to the case in the court 
or agency from which the appeal was taken, as modi-
fied pursuant to Rule 3(g), as well as the designation 
ot the parties both as they appeared in the lower 
court or agency and as they appear in the appeal. In 
addition, the covers shall contain: the name of the 
appellate court; the number of the case m the appel-
late court opposite the case title; the priority number 
of the case, as set forth in Rule 29; the title of the 
document (e g , Brief of Appellant); the nature of the 
proceeding in the appellate court (e.g, Appeal, Peti-
tion for Review) and the name of the court and judge, 
agency or board below; the names and addresses of 
counsel for the respective parties designated as attor-
ney for appellant, petitioner, appellee, or respondent, 
as the case may be. The names of counsel for the 
party filing the document shall appear in the lower 
nght and opposing counsel in the lower left of the 
cover 
